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"Every step you take, every move you make, I'll be watching you."  
The Police, "Every Breath You Take"  
Introduction 
Because the U.S. is a superpower, the world is watching what we do—the forces we have, the 
way we posture them, the actions we take. Oftentimes, the decisions we make about these 
issues will not be driven primarily with an eye to dissuasion. Indeed, they may have more to do 
with the defense goals of defeat, or deterrence or even assurance. But for better or worse, these 
decisions will send messages to a lot of audiences—potential foes, fence sitters, today's 
friends—and there will be some effects related to dissuasion. The hard part is figuring out what 
the effects will be—will our decision dissuade a potential adversary from going down a particular 
military path, or spur their journey—or even expedite it?  
What is the role of U.S. force posture in dissuasion? First, a few definitions are required. Like the 
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review,[1] this paper uses a narrow definition of dissuasion—
discouraging military aspects of competition, or channeling threats in certain directions—rather 
than the broader interpretation of demotivating threatening ambitions in the first place. As well, 
this paper uses a working definition of "dissuasion" as discouraging current or potential 
adversaries from developing, deploying, augmenting (quantitatively), enhancing (qualitatively) or 
transferring military capabilities that would threaten the United States, its forces or its interests.[2] 
And it uses a broad definition of "force posture," meaning current force capabilities, where the 
forces are and how they're postured, military actions taken (whether in exercises or in conflict), 
infrastructure (including the science and technology base that feeds research, development, 
testing and engineering, civilian and military personnel, industrial base and economic wherewithal 
to bring capabilities to fruition quickly) and declaratory policy about all of the above.  
There are a number of ways the U.S. might use its force posture (broadly conceived) to dissuade. 
We can attempt to dissuade potential adversaries from going down certain military paths by 
imposing costs (in the broadest sense), denying gains, increasing risks, maintaining our 
advantages, exploiting the "dissuadee's" weaknesses, raising the barriers to entry or competition, 
feigning disinterest in areas where an adversary's pursuit would worry us, or the opposite—
feigning interest or concern in areas where an adversary's pursuits don't bother us—or some 
combination of the above.[3]  
Dissuasion is the stepchild, the "also ran," the fourth out of the four defense goals when it comes 
to decisions on our force posture, and understandably so: It is a diffuse concept, and it is difficult 
to get a handle on how to make force posture decisions in a way that operationalizes dissuasion. 
Why? 
• First, dissuasion is future-oriented: While the defense goals of deter and defeat both 
address capabilities adversaries have already, dissuasion is aimed at capabilities they do 
not yet have, or do not have in the number or quality they might otherwise have. It is hard 
to make force posture decisions based on the distant future.  
• Second, since it is aimed at influencing the decisions of potential adversaries, dissuasion 
(like deterrence) is context specific. It depends on whom we're trying to dissuade, what 
we're trying to dissuade them from doing, how they see their stakes, how they see our 
stakes, how they weigh risks and gains, how they filter information, how they make 
decisions, their regional situation, their internal politics—all the "local conditions" Keith 
Payne talks about.[4] Since there are multiple actors and actions we may want to 
dissuade—and what is helpful for dissuasion in one case may be counterproductive in 
another—it is a complex set of interactions.  
• Third, even for any one "dissuadee," it is hard to predict whether our dissuasion strategy 
and force posture decisions will have the effect we are seeking. And even if the 
"dissuadee" refrains from doing that which we wished them not to do, it is difficult to 
ascribe cause and effect; they may have refrained for reasons other than our dissuasion 
strategy.  
For example, take the use of force. It is difficult to imagine "dissuasion" being the primary 
rationale for going to war. Use of force decisions are more likely to be determined by the 
defend/defeat goal, with perhaps a second-order goal being to deter the next bad guy. But it is 
doubtful that dissuading a third party far in the future would be the primary driver. Would it be a 
third-order effect? It could be, but it is very difficult to assess the effect far down the road, or the 
effect on "dissuadee" X vs. "dissuadee" Y or Z. It may have an opposite effect—prompting them 
to take the very action we were trying to dissuade. Country X may look at U.S. willingness to go 
into Iraq (when the U.S. Government believed Iraq had chemical weapons, may have had 
biological weapons, and was working on but did not yet have nuclear weapons) and conclude that 
the cost of starting down or continuing on the path of WMD acquisition is just too risky and not 
worth it. Some argue this is what happened in the case of Libya (though there is debate about 
Qadaffi's motives and we may never know for sure how much the war in Iraq factored into this). 
On the other hand, country Y or Z may look at the same Iraq situation, and conclude that the only 
way to protect itself against being "Saddam-ized" is to acquire WMD. Some say this is precisely 
or partly what is motivating North Korea, which may have been reinforced by Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in its determination to acquire nuclear weapons for regime survival. Iran is also showing 
every sign of being determined to go forward, rather than being dissuaded.  
Another example of the uncertainty about the dissuasive effects of U.S. force posture decisions is 
missile defenses. U.S. missile defenses may help to dissuade nations that don't yet have ballistic 
missiles from acquiring them. But what about nations that already have some missiles, such as 
North Korea and Iran? U.S. deployments may dissuade them from building more, from throwing 
good money after bad. Or, the debate in the U.S. over the limitations and ineffectiveness of 
missile defenses, and their ability to be overwhelmed by countermeasures or saturation, might 
convince them that their investment in ballistic missiles remains a good one, and have the 
opposite effect.  
Another example is China. Suppose a U.S. objective were to dissuade China from increasing the 
numbers and sophistication of its nuclear forces—that is, to discourage the Chinese from 
augmenting its nuclear missile force, or enhancing it by MIRVing, going to land-based mobiles, or 
moving to sea-based ballistic missiles. This may or may not be a good dissuasion objective; we'll 
return to that in a moment. But if it were a U.S. dissuasion objective, what's the role of U.S. force 
posture in achieving it?  
Several aspects of U.S. force posture may influence Chinese decisions in this area: nuclear 
forces; non-nuclear strike forces; and missile defenses. The level of U.S. nuclear forces, even 
under the Moscow Treaty, remains high: 1,700-2,200 deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Some 
would argue that a primary reason for keeping force levels high—aside from the publicly-
proclaimed goal of assuring allies that U.S. nuclear forces are "second to none"—is to dissuade 
China from thinking it can compete quantitatively with the U.S. as a nuclear power. That would 
remove one possible motivation for higher numbers of Chinese nuclear forces, since it would be 
difficult for China to build up to levels equal to those of the U.S. for influence purposes.  
On the other hand, both high U.S. nuclear force levels, as well as U.S. non-nuclear strike 
capabilities—about which China has stated its concerns—could lead China to believe it needs 
more nuclear forces, and more mobile ones, if it wants to maintain a survivable nuclear force.  
U.S. missile defense decisions could either dissuade China, or spur it to increase and improve its 
nuclear missiles. The U.S, with its open-ended, no-architecture, spiral-development approach to 
missile defenses, has not decided how much to deploy. The U.S. has maintained that its program 
is aimed at rogue states' ballistic missiles, and has not consciously geared its program toward 
China. And China has long been modernizing its nuclear forces in any event, and may be on a 
steady, predetermined buildup. But there are two other scenarios worth considering.  
In the first alternative scenario, if the U.S. deploys only low levels of missile defenses aimed at 
rogue states' ballistic missiles and not China, missile defense may spur China to go faster and 
farther in MIRVing or going mobile ("sprinting" ahead of our missile defenses, as described in 
Brad Roberts' Strategic Insight). This might be characterized as "unintended collateral dissuasive 
effects"—a force posture decision meant to dissuade one party (the rogue state) from acquiring 
or improving its ballistic missiles may have the collateral effect of spurring or provoking a buildup 
by China that's larger or more sophisticated than it would be absent missile defenses. (One can 
wonder, however, if China ends up with about the same number of ballistic missiles that can 
threaten the United States over and above missile defense capabilities as they have today absent 
defenses, whether much would have changed.)  
In the second alternative scenario, if the U.S. decided at some future date to build missile 
defenses geared toward China, there could be a level of U.S. missile defense forces high enough 
to dissuade China from trying to overcome U.S. defenses—but it is unclear whether such a level 
exists, or what that level might be. Deploying more defenses, at a pretty high level, may dissuade 
China from going to high levels of missiles, or it may spur them on. Whether they are dissuaded 
or spurred on depends on how determined they are, what they think their stakes are, and the 
tradeoffs they are willing to make in order to compete (in this particular area or overall).  
But is dissuading China from augmenting or enhancing its nuclear missile force a good 
dissuasion objective in the first place? The generic question is whether, if we closed off one path, 
"dissuadees" would pursue other paths that could be of greater concern to us. If the U.S. tried to 
deploy sufficient missile defenses (when combined with U.S. offenses) to deny China confidence 
that it can hold the U.S. at risk with its nuclear forces, would China simply redirect its efforts away 
from these areas, and into other areas which the U.S. may find more worrisome—such as threats 
to our use of space, or offensive information operations (IO) such as computer network attacks?  
If it were a trade off, and the U.S. could choose its area of military competition with China, it might 
prefer a competition in the well-understood and arguably manageable areas of nuclear missiles 
and missile defenses rather than in the areas of space or information operations. But that is not 
necessarily the case; the Chinese could be determined to go down the path of space and IO 
capability in any event (some would argue that horse is already out of the barn). However, there 
may be ways to make it harder for them—to raise the costs, deny the benefits, and maintain our 
advantages. 
Operationalizing Dissuasion  
Let's return to the issue of how to operationalize dissuasion and factor it into our force posture 
decisions. If "every move we make and every step we take" affects dissuasion (as well as 
deterrence and assurance), is it too diffuse a concept for the U.S. to have a coherent dissuasion 
strategy? If dissuasion is influenced by everything, does it drive nothing? If it is inherently difficult 
to sort what its effects will be, and to disentangle the complex and often contradictory interactions 
of multiple decisions on multiple actors, should we throw up our hands and see dissuasion as 
only a byproduct of our force posture decisions—something best seen in the rear-view mirror?  
As the 2001 QDR stated, "To have a dissuasive effect, this combination of technical, 
experimental and operational activity has to have a clear strategic focus  [emphasis added]." But 
what is that "clear strategic focus" of U.S. dissuasion strategy? The nature of dissuasion—its 
diffuseness, complexity and the difficulty of predicting outcomes—would suggest that we should 
choose a few dissuasion goals and a few of the most pertinent aspects of our force posture, and 
focus on them. Examples of specific actors we may want to dissuade from doing something 
specific (which were discussed earlier) could include dissuading China from becoming a threat to 
U.S. space or information capabilities, or dissuading rogue states from acquiring (or augmenting 
and enhancing) WMD and/or ballistic missiles.  
Most U.S. force posture decisions—such as the use of force, or what systems to acquire—are 
driven mainly by the defense goals of "deter" and "defeat." However, because of the future-
looking nature of dissuasion, one aspect of force posture which lends itself to being driven 
primarily by dissuasion considerations is our infrastructure for science, technology, research, 
development, testing and engineering (S&T/RDT&E) short of full-scale production. In the 
S&T/RDT&E area, having a diversity of technologies and a variety of options for capabilities that 
we could bring to fruition is a powerful dissuasion tool. Adding dissuasion to the factors to be 
weighed when budget and programmatic decisions are being made gives the future a seat at the 
table.  
Dissuasion may also drive force decisions about whether to get rid of things we already have, at 
least where the costs of maintaining what we have are relatively low. This is arguably a rationale 
for maintaining U.S. advantages in the nuclear, naval, and air power arenas—less because they 
are needed at today's level and sophistication to deter and defeat current threats, and more 
because the scale and sheer force levels in these areas provide barriers to entry or barriers to 
competition for any nation that might want to have forces perceived as approaching ours in these 
areas.  
There are additional questions and issues associated with dissuasion and force posture:  
• The 2001 QDR, in addressing the need for "a clear strategic focus" for dissuasion, also 
states that "New processes and organizations are needed within the defense 
establishment to provide this focus." Should dissuasion objectives be a U.S. Government 
decision, and what is the role of the National Security Council and the State Department? 
Within the Department of Defense, who is the advocate for dissuasion in U.S. force 
posture decisions? Is it OSD Policy? Or the Joint Staff/J-5? Is it STRATCOM, which was 
given the role of drafting the Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept—which also 
addresses dissuasion? Does dissuasion appear as an explicit factor when PA&E and J-8 
are framing programmatic and budget decisions? Who is sitting at the table when 
decisions are being made and insisting that dissuasion be considered? And what is the 
relationship between transformation and dissuasion?  
• How much should we talk openly about what our dissuasion objectives are? As soon as 
U.S. officials say publicly or declare in official documents that they want to dissuade a 
particular state from going down a particular path, does it make it that capability much 
more attractive to the "dissuadee?"  
• What should the U.S. say about force capabilities? Should the U.S. take dissuasion into 
account in its decisions on what to release on the technical aspects of programs and 
tests, to magnify the perception of our capabilities in order to increase the perception by 
"dissuadees" of gains denied and of costs that would be incurred, of barriers that would 
have to be overcome to have an effective capability against the U.S.?  
• Since our S&T/RDT&E reputation will be important for dissuasion, what can the U.S. do 
to foster or reinforce the perception that U.S. scientists are innovative, creative and can 
tackle any problem and solve it—that U.S. scientists (whether in academia, industry or 
government) can invent anything and can make it work, and that we have the economic 
wherewithal to bring it to fruition?  
• When should the U.S. make clear the capabilities it is pursuing, and when should it 
"spring" something new and impressive on the world (à la the B-2 bomber rollout) to 
reinforce the perception of potential adversaries that the U.S. may have a potential they 
don't know about?  
• Whatever dissuasion goals and strategy the U.S. adopts, it must be consistent with U.S. 
values and the U.S. national character. For instance, the U.S. Government couldn't 
sustain a massive deception campaign (certainly not if it is known to be a deception) as 
part of a dissuasion effort, given the way our system works and our open society—and 
efforts to do so would be counterproductive. Having a consistent message to which 
everyone adheres is not the American way. Confusing adversaries so they don't know 
exactly what we're pursuing seriously (since every program is someone's pet rock) or 
how good we are at it would likely be a much more feasible form of dissuasion for the 
United States.  
Conclusion 
For most aspects of force posture—force sizing, basing, use of force—dissuasion is not the main 
driver, but a byproduct of decisions taken for other reasons. There may be only a handful of 
decisions driven primarily by dissuasion: our decisions on the science and technology base, 
RDT&E, and other infrastructure aspects of our posture—the "seed corn" that affects perceptions 
about what the U.S. can do in the future; and decisions about when to hold on to forces we 
already have to raise the barriers to competition or equality in a particular area. The idea of 
"future risk"—usually sacrificed to immediate, operational, "defend and defeat" risks—is the 
reason dissuasion is an important concept. But dissuasion is a prism through which we should 
consciously run all our force posture decisions, so that we are conscious of the fact that what we 
have, say and do has an effect on decisions of potential adversaries and fence sitters and the 
military paths they choose to take or not take.  
For cases where dissuasion will be a primary driver, the United States should:  
• Choose a few dissuasion goals, and focus its efforts on closing off paths that are most 
worrisome;  
• Identify the "dissuasion advocates" for the internal decision-making process;  
• Not talk publicly about its dissuasion objectives; and  
• Ensure that U.S. dissuasion strategy is consistent with the U.S. national character—since 
any dissuasion strategy that includes a cacophony of voices saying diverse and 
contradictory things plays to America 's strengths.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic 
Insights home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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